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The information about what one can see and what other people can see from different 
viewpoints is important. There are circumstances in which adults and children make 
systematic errors when predicting what is visible from their own or others’ viewpoints. 
This happens for example when reasoning about mirrors. We explored differences among 
three developmental groups: young adults (N = 60) typically developing children (N = 30); 
and children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD, N = 30). We used an illustration of a 
top-down view of a room with a mirror on a wall (Room Observer and Mirror Perspective 
test: ROMP). Participants selected (circled on paper) which objects behind the observer 
in the room were visible, reflected from the mirror and from a given position (viewpoint). 
For half of each group, the observer in the room was described as a teddy bear; for the 
other half, it was described as a child. Overall, there were many errors in all groups, which 
we separate in errors of ignoring the viewpoint (same response to all three locations) and 
inversion errors (choosing objects on the left instead of the right or vice versa). In addition 
to the overall task difficulty, the ASD group made relatively more mistakes of ignoring the 
viewpoint compared to the other groups and underestimated how many objects were 
visible in the teddy bear condition that is when the viewpoint was an inanimate object. 
We suggest that this is related to a delay in theory of mind (ToM) development.
Keywords: autistic spectrum disorder, reasoning, children, perspective-taking, theory of mind, reasoning about 
mirrors, typical and atypical development
INTRODUCTION
As an organism moves in the environment, the view changes, revealing or hiding different 
objects. Taking into consideration, the viewpoint of other individuals is also important because 
it determines what someone can see at any point in time. Research has found that when 
people evaluate a scene in terms of what is visible to an individual, they make random and 
systematic errors. Children often display an egocentric bias (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956; 
Soranzo et al. Reasoning: Age and Development Type
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 October 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 722213
Moore et  al., 1995), and errors in both children and adults 
can be influenced by the ability to distinguish our own perspective 
from the perspective of others (Moore et  al., 1995; Birch and 
Bloom, 2004; Epley et  al., 2004). In a complementary fashion, 
the importance of other people’s viewpoint is also highlighted 
by the suggestion that adults compute other perspectives even 
when it is not necessary or detrimental to the task (Samson 
et  al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2017).
A situation that is particularly challenging for both adults 
and children is that of a mirror reflection. The general pattern 
is one in which people claim that what is visible in a mirror 
are the objects in front of the mirror itself, irrespective of the 
location of the viewer (Croucher et  al., 2002; Bertamini et  al., 
2010). For example, when asked to judge where a person 
entering a room and moving parallel to a mirror surface would 
see their own reflection a large percentage of adults believe 
that it is not necessary to reach the edge of the mirror (Croucher 
et  al., 2002). Some (a minority) believe that the image will 
appear at the far edge rather than the near edge (Bertamini 
et  al., 2003). Similar errors are found for more complex 
movements with respect to the mirror surface (i.e. not parallel 
motion, Savardi et  al., 2010).
The root of the difficulty is that people fail to understand 
the role of the viewpoint. This is clearly illustrated by the 
Room Observer and Mirror Perspective (ROMP) task (Bertamini 
et  al., 2010; Bertamini, 2014; Bertamini and Soranzo, 2018). 
Here, individuals are asked to decide which objects along a 
wall of a room are visible to a person facing in the opposite 
direction, given that a mirror is present on the wall facing 
the person. The procedure is based on a top-down map of a 
room and a drawing showing the position of the person and 
of the mirror. When the position of the observer is to the 
left of the mirror, they could see the objects to the right, and 
when the observer is to the right, they could see the objects 
to the left. An example of a diagram used in the ROMP task 
is shown in Figure  1.
To answer questions about what another person can see 
individuals need to be  able to take someone else’s perspective. 
The ability to represent that another person sees something 
different from what we  see is referred to as Level-1 visual 
perspective-taking. By age 2, children understand the role of 
visual perspective when instructed to show another person a 
picture (Lempers et  al., 1977). Even younger children show 
sensitivity to gaze information. For example, Brooks and Meltzoff 
(2002) found that 12-month-old infants followed a person’s 
gaze direction more when the person’s eyes were open, and 
Sodian et  al. (2007) found differences in looking time in 
14-month-old infants, showing that they were aware that a 
person could or could not see a target object. The ability to 
understand how another person sees things and how objects 
appear to them is referred to as Level 2 perspective-taking. 
Although Level 2 may be  achieved later than Level 1, they 
both appear present in the first few years of life in humans 
(Flavell et  al., 1981; Moll and Meltzoff, 2011).
Individuals who have a delayed or atypical ability in 
perspective-taking may find perspective-taking tasks more 
difficult. This is the case of children with a diagnosis of 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD). We  briefly discuss theory 
of mind (ToM) in relation to ASD. ToM includes the ability 
to process another’s perspective and enable individuals to 
comprehend and predict the behaviour of others (Baron-Cohen 
et  al., 1985). Tasks used to explore ToM involve perspective-
taking (Reed and Peterson, 1990). It has been shown that 
children with ASD demonstrate deficits in perspective-taking 
tasks as compared to age-matched typically developing children 
(Rehfeldt et  al., 2007). Individual differences in cognitive 
ability impact on performance in these tasks (Hughes et  al., 
2005; Ronald et  al., 2006; Conway and Bird, 2018), such as 
intelligence, language acquisition and developmental disorders. 
Where some research indicates that ToM is a single cognitive 
ability, which is either acquired or not (Happé, 1994; Hughes 
and Ensor, 2007), other research suggests that this acquisition 
is a process, achieved in a series of developmental stages 
(Wellman, 2002; Wellman and Liu, 2004). Children understand 
belief and desire, but the understanding of false belief is 
more difficult to acquire (Harris, 1992; Leslie, 1994). This 
difficulty may lie in the inability to inhibit the natural instinct 
to respond from one’s own perspective (Moore et  al., 1995; 
Carlson and Moses, 2001).
Our study is not specifically about ToM, and we  have 
described it because it is relevant to understand possible 
individual differences. A child is typically ascribed to have 
achieved ToM by age 4, although this process continues up 
to around age 11 (Perner and Wimmer, 1985; Stone et  al., 
1998; Liddle and Nettle, 2006; Apperly et  al., 2009). If a ToM 
is normally developed by age 11, it follows that typically 
developing children should be as competent as adults in visual 
perspective-taking tasks by this age.
There is an association between autism and ToM 
(Baron-Cohen et  al., 1985; Heavey et al., 2000). ASD children 
may perform poorly on perspective-taking tasks (Birch and 
Bernstein, 2007). However, if ToM is not inextricably linked 
to the ability to understand visual perspective, then children 
with a developmental delay should perform similarly to children 
who are typically developing. Children and adults with ASD 
generally perform well on visual tasks (Mottron et  al., 2006; 
Tager-Flusberg, 2007), and this may also account for similar 
or indeed superior performance on some spatial tasks.
THE STUDY
In this study, we  used a diagram of a room, and the task 
was to indicate what an observer in the room could see when 
looking at a mirror on a wall (ROMP task). In particular, the 
task was to evaluate which objects (resembling sweets in this 
case) behind the observer were visible from a mirror (indicated 
by a thicker line on the wall in front of the observer). Previous 
studies have found a tendency to overestimate what is visible 
and a lack of sensitivity to viewpoint (Bertamini et  al., 2010; 
Bertamini and Soranzo, 2018); however, the procedure has 
not been used with children before. Furthermore, different 
types of development were not considered before. Here, we focus 
on performance of typical development children (TD children) 
Soranzo et al. Reasoning: Age and Development Type
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children with a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD 
children) and young adults.
In all groups, we  used the same stimuli, shown in Figure  1. 
They were simple diagrams, and each group of participants (adults, 
TD children, and ASD children) was divided into two subgroups. 
For one subgroup, the observer in the room was described as a 
child; for the other subgroup, the observer was described a teddy 
bear. This manipulation further explores the degree by which 
individuals can take the viewpoint of another observer and whether 
it matters if this observer is a human being. We  reason that 
there may be  an additional challenge when individuals need to 
assign a mental state to an inanimate object (a teddy bear). Teddy 
bears have been previously used to investigate perspective-taking 
(e.g. Bertamini and Soranzo, 2018; Russo et  al., 2018). They have 
the characteristic that although their semblance suggests that they 
own a viewpoint, they lack a proper mental state, and it needs 
to be  explicitly assigned.
We therefore hypothesise that it would be  more difficult 
to reason about is visible in the mirror in particular for ASD 




We tested 60 children attending mainstream primary schools 
in Sheffield (United Kingdom). Thirty had a diagnosis of autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD group), and 30 were classified as 
typically developing (TD group). Half of the participants were 
males, and half were females. The mean age was 9.78 years 
(SD = 1.41). Participants were recruited according to whether 
they had a diagnosis of ASD, and these participants were then 
matched by the Special Educational Needs Co-ordinator in 
A
B
FIGURE 1 | (A) The Room Observer and Mirror Perspective test (ROMP) task is based on the diagram of a room containing an observer and a mirror. The task is to 
select what objects on the back wall would be visible to the observer. For illustration, we overlap two observers. For the observer on the right, the visible sweets are 
3–7; for the observer on the left, the visible sweets were 12–16. (B) Six layouts used in this study. Each diagram was printed on A4 paper. The columns show the 
three locations (left, middle and right), and the rows show the two observers (Child, Teddy bear).
Soranzo et al. Reasoning: Age and Development Type
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each school to typically developing children of the same age, 
sex and ability. The project was approved by the Psychology 
Research Ethics Panel at Sheffield Hallam University (nr. 
E7030/2019). For comparison, we  also tested 60 young adults. 
The procedure was the same, but the participants were 
undergraduate students, enrolled on a Psychology degree. The 
mean age was 18.63 years (SD = 1.10). The majority (48) 
were females.
Design
The first factor was Development type: there was a group of 
TD children, a group of ASD children and a group of adults 
(all TD). Another between-subject factor was the observer in 
the room (Observer type). For one subgroup, it was described 
as a child; for the other subgroup, it was described as a teddy 
bear. Each participant saw three locations of the observer, left, 
centre and right. We  call this within-subjects factor Location 
(Figure  1).
Procedure
Data from children were collected in May and June of 2018. 
Five local schools in North Sheffield were contacted and asked 
to participate in the study, and four schools responded. 
Participants were invited to participate in the research via a 
letter to parents, and children were asked for verbal consent 
at the time of the experiment. Data from young adults were 
collected during the 2018/2019 academic year.
Each child was tested individually. Within each group of 
30 participants (ASD and TD), 15 (50%) were shown a child, 
and 15 (50%) were shown a teddy bear. In a familiarisation 
phase, each participant was shown a 3D model of the room 
(Figure  2 shows the model with a teddy bear). They were 
invited to observe either the child or the teddy in each of 
the three positions and to hold the box to look into it. This 
was an important stage to ensure that they understood the 
task and to avoid relying on verbal instructions only, that 
might have impacted on the performance.
The box was then removed, and the children viewed three 
separate sheets of A4 paper, showing either a child or a teddy 
bear in three locations (left, middle and right). Participants 
were asked to imagine how many sweets could be seen reflected 
in the mirror, either from the child perspective or from the 
perspective of the teddy bear. They were informed that the 
child/teddy could look in any direction, but that it must remain 
in one place. Children were then asked to circle the number 
of sweets they believed would be  visible in the mirror to the 
child/teddy. The procedure used for the young adults was the 
same except that they were not shown the model of the room.
RESULTS
Figure  3 shows the overall number of times each sweet was 
circled for each condition (e.g. the frequency bar would 
be  30 units if a sweet was selected by all the participants in 
that condition). The shaded area in each box represents the 
correct answer. Participants made a large number of errors. 
If we consider a strict criterion (selecting all the correct sweets 
and only the correct sweets), no one was perfect, because, as 
anticipated, the task was difficult.
Sensitivity to the Viewpoint vs. Sensitivity 
to Optics
We distinguish between viewpoint sensitivity and sensitivity 
to optics in the following way. Viewpoint sensitivity refers to 
the ability to recognise that the location of the viewer matters, 
even without knowing correctly what is visible from that 
viewpoint. Therefore, on the basis of viewpoint sensitivity 
participants should give different answers to different viewpoints 
(an effect of Location). Sensitivity to optics refers to the ability 
to recognise that a viewpoint on the left makes objects on 
the right visible and vice versa. This follows from the optical 
principle that angle of incidence and angle of reflection are 
the same, although here we  are not interested in explicit 
knowledge of optics. Note that an individual may know the 
correct answer based not on knowledge of optics but simply 
on experience, because when one stands on the right side in 
a room (as described in Figure  1), they would see objects on 
the left of the room and vice versa. To assess whether a 
participant displays these sensitivities, we classified their pattern 
of responses into three categories: correct, inverted and unbiased.
Correct Responses
Participants show a correct pattern of responses when they 
circled more sweets on the opposite side of the viewpoint rather 
than on the same side.
Inverted Responses
Participants show an inverted pattern of responses when they 
circled more sweets on the same side of the viewpoint rather 
than on the opposite side. Although this response pattern is 
FIGURE 2 | The box was used to illustrate the task. This photo shows a 
teddy bear, but male and female dolls were also used to illustrate the ROMP 
task.
Soranzo et al. Reasoning: Age and Development Type
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wrong, it shows that the participants respond to the location 
of the viewpoint.
Unbiased Responses
Participants show an unbiased pattern of responses when they 
circled the same sweets for all viewpoint locations. In this 
case, participants do not consider the location of the viewpoint 
as a factor, and therefore, there is no bias.
For the sake of clarity, the comparisons of sensitivities were 
split between adults vs. TD children and TD vs. ASD children. 
Table 1 presents the frequencies of correct and unbiased responses 
for the different groups. The 𝜒2 statistic with Yates’s correction 
indicates that there is no difference between the two age groups 
[TD children and adults; 𝜒2 = 0.04, p = 0.84]. However, the 
comparison within the two groups of children does show an 
interesting difference. There are more unbiased responses among 
the ADS children than in TD children. A test of association 
confirms this pattern: the 𝜒2 statistic with Yates’s correction was 
5.39; p < 0.05. In addition, there was a tendency for the effect 
within the ADS group to be  larger when Observer type was 
the teddy bear (correct: 3; unbiased: 7) rather than a child 
(correct: 7; unbiased: 4), but this pattern could not be statistically 
analysed due to the small number of subjects per category.
Our first analysis (Table 1) focused on the correct responses 
and the unbiased responses (one type of error). In our second 
analysis, we  compared the correct bias (correct responses) and 
the inverted bias (a different type of error). This comparison 
provides a measure of sensitivity to optics.
Table  2 presents the frequencies of correct and inverted 
responses for the different groups. There was no difference in 
the sensitive to optics between children and adults. A test of 
association confirms that these frequencies are consistent with 
the null hypothesis. The 𝜒2 statistic with Yates’s correction was 
2.43; p = 0.12. There was also no significant difference in the 
sensitive to optics between the two development types. The 
𝜒2 statistic with Yates’s correction was 0.01; p = 0.93. Therefore, 
it seems that the difference that emerged for correct and 
unbiased responses between the two development types was 
not due to a difference in sensitivity to optics.
Because half of the participants saw an observer described 
as a child and the other half saw a teddy bear, we  lacked the 
sample size to analyse this difference. These frequencies treat 
the two cases together. In the next analysis, we  take a different 
approach, we compute a continuous measure of overestimation, 
and we  analyse the difference between the viewpoint type: 
child and teddy bear.
Overestimation of What Is Visible
To further explore the differences between groups, we analysed 
the total number of sweets selected minus the correct number 
of sweets that needed to be  circled. Therefore, this index is 
zero for correct answers, negative values represent an 
underestimation, and positive values indicate an overestimation 
of how many objects are visible. Mean estimation values are 
shown in Figure  4. As a correct number of objects does not 
imply that the correct items were selected, this analysis focuses 
exclusively on the quantity of the estimation. It is, therefore, 
fundamentally different from the previous analyses.
FIGURE 3 | The columns show the three locations (left, middle and right) and the two observers (child, teddy bear). The overall number of times (frequency) 
each sweet was circled is shown for each condition. The shaded area shows the correct region (visible sweets).
TABLE 1 | Correct vs. unbiased pattern of responses in relation to age (left) and 
in relation to Development type (right). 
TD children Adults ADS children
Correct response 14(73.78%) 39(79.69%) 10(47.62%)
Unbiased response 5(26.32%) 10(20.41%) 11(52.38%)
Inverted responses not included.
Soranzo et al. Reasoning: Age and Development Type
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We used generalised linear mixed-effects models implemented 
in the lme4 package (Bates et  al., 2007) in R version 3.5.1 
(R Core Team, 2017). Fixed factors were Development (Adults, 
TD children and ASD children) and Observer (Teddy bear vs. 
Child). The dependent variable was the number of sweets that 
the participants selected as visible in the mirror (Estimation 
analysis). Residuals were independent and normally distributed 
as indicated by an istrogram plot. The initial random effects 
structures represented the maximal model (Barr et  al., 2013). For 
both analyses, we  included participant as a random intercept 
with fully crossed random slopes for estimation. The models were 
simplified until convergence was reached. Log likelihood-ratio (χ2) 
comparisons were obtained through the sequential decomposition 
of the model (Bates et  al., 2007), which provided confirmatory 
tests for the predictors. The marginal and conditional R2 effect 
sizes are also reported as measures of the variance explained by 
the model with the random effect structure included (conditional 
R2) and excluded (marginal R2) from the calculation (Nakagawa 
and Schielzeth, 2013; Johnson, 2014; Nakagawa et  al., 2017).
The maximal models that converged contained random 
intercepts for participant, but no random slopes. The total 
explanatory power was substantial (conditional R2 = 0.5), and 
the part related to the fixed effects alone (marginal R2) was 
0.05. The intercept, corresponding to Development type equal 
to Adult and observer equal to child, was 0.05 [95% CI [−0.79, 
0.89], t(352) = 0.11, p = 0.912]. Within this model, there were 
no main effects. However, there was a significant interaction 
between Development and Observer [beta = −0.42, SE = 0.11, 
95% CI [−0.64, −0.20], t(118) = −3.74, p < 0.001] although small 
(std. beta = −0.15, std. SE = 0.040). This interaction was further 
explored through the emmeans R package (Lenth, 2021) which 
showed a difference between both Adult vs. ASD children 
(estimated difference = 1.7, p < 0.05) and TS children vs. ASD 
children (estimated difference = 1.7, p = 0.09) when the observer 
was the Teddy bear. All other interactions reported a value 
of p  > 0.84.
The main conclusion from the analysis of estimation is that 
there was no overall pattern of over or underestimation, as 
shown in Figure  4. The only significant effect was that of the 
interaction between Development type and Observer: as shown 
in Figure  4, this was because of a tendency by ASD children 
to underestimate what the teddy bear could see.
DISCUSSION
In this study, typically developed children, children with a 
diagnosis of autism and adults performed a simple task involving 
familiar objects. In a top view map of a rectangular room, 
an observer (a child or a teddy bear) looks towards a wall. 
On the wall behind them, there are many sweets (ROMP test, 
Figure  1). What object can they see without turning around 
and therefore looking at the objects in the mirror?
Despite this simple task and the familiar context, participants 
made many errors. We distinguish between two types of errors. 
The original study used this test in young adults (Bertamini 
et al., 2010) and found that responses were similar for different 
locations of the viewpoint. This shows a lack of social sensitivity 
in the sense that the viewpoint of the observer is not seen 
as relevant. A second type of error happens when the objects 
selected are on the right side when they should be  on the 
left or vice versa. This shows that the viewpoint is seen as 
important, but it is used incorrectly. We  call this a lack of 
sensitivity to optics because it shows a lack of knowledge that 
a location on the left makes objects on the right visible and 
vice versa. Viewpoint is treated as relevant, but in a way that 
it is at odds with what is predicted by optics, as well as what 
is predicted by experience.
To perform this task, subjects need to have an ability to 
take someone else’s perspective. Since taking someone else’s 
perspective requires a ToM, we  considered the developmental 
aspects of perspective-taking. Individuals who have a delayed 
or atypical ability in understanding others’ point of view may 
find these tasks more difficult. In addition, to further explore 
the link between ToM and perspective-taking, we consider two 
types of observers: a human child and a teddy bear (inanimate 
object; without a proper mental state).
Overall results show that there were many mistakes by both 
children and adults. This is a task that is simple to describe but 
participants are unable to locate the exact objects visible. This 
is consistent with the literature (e.g. Croucher et al., 2002; Bertamini 
et  al., 2003). When we  analysed the types of errors, we  found 
TABLE 2 | Correct vs. inverted pattern of responses in relation to age (left) and 
in relation to Development type (right). 
TD children Adults ADS children
Correct response 14(44%) 39(76.47%) 10(52.63%)
Inverted response 11(56%) 12(23.53%) 9(47.37%)
Unbiased responses not included.
FIGURE 4 | Mean estimation of the visible sweets relative to the correct 
number. Zero represents a correct answer, while higher values represent an 
overestimation of how many sweets are visible when looking at the mirror. 
Error bars are ±1 SE for the mean.
Soranzo et al. Reasoning: Age and Development Type
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no difference in a developmental comparison (TD children and 
adults). However, when comparing TD children and ASD children, 
we  found a difference specifically for the social sensitivity. For 
ASD children, there were more responses of the type that ignored 
the role of the viewpoint. We  suggest that this is related to a 
delay in ToM development (Baron-Cohen et  al., 1985).
We also analysed the degree of over or underestimation by 
comparing the number of objects circled with respect to the correct 
number. When we compared the groups, children showed a stronger 
tendency to underestimation if the observer was described as a 
teddy bear, but this effect was specific to ASD children (an interaction 
between type of development and type of observer). The pattern 
for ASD children is consistent across the two analyses, they seem 
to find the task harder (more errors of ignoring the location of 
the viewpoint), and they, at least in the case of the teddy bear, 
tend to underestimate how many objects are visible.
On the one hand, as already noted, this is consistent with 
our overall hypothesis that being able to understand someone 
else’s viewpoint is important in this task and may be  harder 
for ASD children. It also seems likely that they struggle with 
assigning a mental state to an inanimate object. However, there 
is some evidence of a relative advantage that ASD children 
have in engagement with anthropomorphic stimuli. They tend 
to anthropomorphise non-human agents more than controls 
(Atherton and Cross, 2018).
Limitations and Future Directions
Although children of both groups belong the same school and 
were matched also in terms of their ability, a formal assessment 
of their mental age was not conducted.
It would be interesting in the future to further assess whether 
performance in the ROMP task varies as a function of the 
degree of ‘inanimate-ness’ adopted as viewpoints.
Summary
Overall, this study is a first exploration of developmental aspects 
of perspective-taking in the context of a mirror task. We  note 
that the ROMP procedure is easy to implement and informative. 
It also lends itself to compare different agents (animate and 
inanimate). Our sample was not large, and some of the differences 
due to development do require confirmation from future work. 
The motivation for the current study was that the ROMP task 
requires processing of visual perspective; therefore, we reasoned 
that a developmental delay may add difficulty to the task. 
We  found that there were more errors for ASD children. 
We  note that it was not a generic pattern of random errors, 
and they were systematic errors, in particular in relation to 
the understanding of the role of the viewpoint, precisely the 
social aspect of the task.
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